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Notes On Iran-contra Affair Investigation, May 20
by Deborah Tyroler
Category/Department: General
Published: Friday, May 22, 1987
May 20: According to testimony before the joint congressional committee investigating the Irancontra affair and a series of documents, some contra leaders were perceived by US officials and
other participants in the private contra aid network as wasteful, incompetent and possibly corrupt.
Even as Reagan was equating the contra leaders with the "founding fathers", former National
Security Council staff member Lt. Col. Oliver North was receiving a stream of reports containing
entirely different assessments. Letters by Robert Owen to North in 1985 and 1986 reported
internal political bickering, a very different picture than the CIA reports of the same period. Other
documents suggest that the administration misled Congress with its assertions that the contras
lacked military supplies. Owen's testimony and his assessment of the situation were confirmed
by other government officials that the contras had but one leader, Adolfo Calero. Owen's memos
suggest that the other contra leaders Alfonso Robelo and Arturo Cruz were less than equal partners
added to please Congress. That structure has since collapsed, amid complaints from Robelo and
Cruz that they were unequal to Calero. Owen's memos to North told of charges circulating among
the contras of "sweetheart deals," referring to arms transactions with Secord. They detail how
Calero rebuffed efforts of US officials to build up the power of Robelo and Cruz. In a March 1986
memo, Owen call Calero a "creation" of the United States. Edgar Chamorro, a member of the contra
directorate until 1984, said that the CIA selected Calero as a contra leader in 1983 and predicted that
he would be president of Nicaragua someday. Now, some US officials who work with the contras
say they are concerned that, should the contras ever attain power in Nicaragua, their leader may
be ill-suited to run the country. [During a May 21 interview on PBS's McNeil-Lehrer News Hour,
Chamorro said that Calero was a CIA "asset" even before the downfall of Somoza.] Owen's memos
said that Calero surrounded himself with aides who were "liars and greed-and power-motivated,"
adding, "This war has become a business to many of them. There is still a belief the Marines are
going to have to invade, so let's get set so we will automatically be the ones put into power." Owen
also said that Calero was a "strong man" and that if members of the US Government "think they
control Calero, they have another think coming." He went on: "The question should be asked, does
Calero manipulate the US government? On several occasions, the answer is yes." Referring to the
contra aid package passed in 1986, Owen wrote that without improvements, it "will be like pouring
money down a sinkhole," and added, "things will not get better, they will get worse. The heavy
hand of the gringo is needed." When Congress cut off aid in 1984, North arranged for money to
be funneled directly to contra bank accounts from foreign contributors. He wrote Calero, "Please
do not in any way make anyone aware of the deposit. Too much is becoming known by too many
people. We need to make sure that this new financing does not become known. The Congress must
believe there continues to be an urgent need for funding." Months later, North decided to take
control of the money. From that point on, money was funneled into various Swiss bank accounts,
and airdrops to the contras were arranged with money controlled by Secord and Hakim. According
to Secord and Owen, finances were reshuffled because of concerns that Calero's brother, Mario,
was involved in buying supplies for the contras. Calero has vigorously defended his brother from
charges of corruption. Instead, Mario complained that the contras were being overcharged by
Secord. In November 1985, Owen wrote of Adolfo Calero's rocky relations with other members of
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the movement, including what a appears to be a reference to then-prohibited help from the CIA, or
the "Agency." "Adolfo is feeling lied to by everyone. He doesn't trust the Agency, the Hondurans,
Cruz, Robelo or anyone." (From various reports, including NEW YORK TIMES, 05/21/87.) Adolfo
Calero, head of the main contra army, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), testified before
the joint congressional committee under oath. He reiterated past statements that while he did not
receive monies deriving from the sale of US military hardware to Iran, a total of $33.7 million from
non-US government sources and private donors were received during the 1985-1986 period when
official US military aid to the contras was banned. Calero claimed that profits from the Iran arms
sales could have been used to establish an airlift supply operation in 1986 for the contras. He said
the airlift operation was principally directed at supplying the Southern contra front, which is not
controlled by the FDN. That operation, he added, was limited to supplying arms and munitions to
contras fighters inside Nicaragua. Next, the FDN chief testified that his organization received arms
and munitions in 1984 and 1985 via private support networks run by retired major general Richard
Secord, retired general John Singlaub and others. He said he was informed by Secord in 1984 that
the contras might receive between $15 and $25 million from the Middle East, and that requests for
the same had been made to a Saudi Arabian prince or sheik. Previous testimony has indicated that
between 1984 and 1985, Saudi Arabia donated $1 million to $2 million per month to the contras at
the request of then National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, and later, after a meeting between
President Reagan and Saudi King Fahd. According to Calero, he and his associates were pleasantly
surprised every time they received the monthly deposits, but that they were not not aware of the
source. Calero testified that he met with North some 50 times in 1984 to 1986 in order to keep North
informed of the contras' needs, donations, and arms purchases (content, sources, arrangements,
and price). The contra leader stated that although he received military intelligence reports from
North, the latter were never used to plan and execute contra military operations. Of the total monies
received by the FDN between 1984 and 1986, Calero said that nearly $14 million were not used for
the purchase of weapons and ammunition. The lion's share of this amount, he testified, was spent in
the purchase of uniforms, boots, medical supplies and foodstuffs for the troops during a 13-month
period. In addition, Calero said he gave $90,000 in travelers checks to North in support of a private
effort to rescue US hostages in Lebanon. The FDN chief said he understood that Reagan approved
the effort, which he added involved US Drug Enforcement Administration agents. Calero did not
demonstrate surprise when informed that North had used only $25,000 in the rescue effort, while
the remaining monies were used in payments to other contra leaders. The contra leader said he
and North had discussed at one time other leaders' need for money, and that providing the same
with funds in a direct fashion was not advisable. He said Alfonso Robelo had received hundreds
of thousands of dollars, while Fernando Chamorro had received somewhat less. (Basic data from
several news wires, including Agence France Presse, 05/20/87)
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